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Transnational Dealings-Morrison Continues
to Make Waves
MARC I. STEINBERG* AND KELLY FLANAGAN**

Abstract
Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank Ltd. drastically altered the landscape for transnational
securities litigation and the way that courts determine proper application of a statute concerninga
transnationalclaim. The Supreme Court's characterizationof extraterritorialityunder the Securities Exchange Act as a merits-based inquiry has led to a reexaminationof limitations under other
federal statutes that were previously thought to be jurisdictionalissues. Significantly, Morrison
created a roadmap for courts to follow when the extraterritorialityof a statute is questioned. The
key to proper applicationof a statute is to decipher the minimum U.S. contacts required to state a
transnationalclaim. The tests developed addressing this inquiry are critical in discerning the
boundariesof U.S. law at a time when transnationaldealings are prevalent.

I.

Introduction
The Supreme Court in Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank Ltd.,1 significantly altered

the treatment of transnational securities claims. This article explores Morrison's impact,
including trends that may emerge and questions that remain. The article commences with
an analysis of this important decision. Thereafter, the widespread implications of Morrison's merits-based characterization are addressed. The article then considers how Morrison affects extraterritorial claims under other federal laws. Lastly, there is a detailed
analysis of the types of securities claims that endure after Morrison. The article's focus is
how Morrison will have longstanding effects on both U.S. federal securities and non-securities law.

* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law.

Associate Counsel, Texas Association of REALTORS®.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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H. Making Waves-Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
A.

PRE-MORRISON-THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM

Understanding the background of section 10(b), which is the principal antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, and its application to transnational securities fraud
sets the stage for Morrison. Prior to Morrison, lower federal courts held that section 10(b)
was silent as to extraterritorial application. 2 When transactions with an international connection arose, courts considered whether there was subject-matter jurisdiction under section 10(b) to adjudicate the claim.3 In determining extraterritorial applicability, lower
federal courts focused on policy matters such as the possible creation of a U.S. haven for
those defrauding foreign investors and Congress's intent to establish a high standard of
conduct in securities transactions. 4 Also significant, the Second Circuit attempted to discern, based on section 10(b)'s underlying purposes,5 whether Congress desired to invoke
6
the resources of U.S. courts in the transnational context.
With these considerations in mind, federal appellate courts, most notably the Second
Circuit, developed what became known as the "conduct" and "effects" test.7 The conduct
analysis inquired "whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States." 8 The
analysis applied to investors harmed abroad and varied depending on whether the investor
was an American or a foreigner. 9 When U.S. investors suffered losses abroad, the Second
Circuit required that materially important acts performed in the United States "signifi2. See, e.g., In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (1 Ith Cir. 2009); Morrison v. Nat'l Austi.
Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008); Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 90405 (5th Cit. 1997).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). See, e.g., In re CP Ships, 578 F.3d at 1312-13; Morrison, 547 F.3d at 176;
Robinson, 117 F.3d at 904; Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Cont'l Grain
(Austi.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th Cir. 1979).
4. See, e.g., MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing the policy
considerations of the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits where acts within the United States have affected
foreign investors).
5. The underlying purpose of section 10(b) was "to remedy deceptive and manipulative conduct with the
potential to harm the public interest or the interests of investors." Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A.
v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 73-1838, at 32-33 (1934)).
6. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170 (referring to Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.
1975)).
7. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (creating
the conduct test); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1968) (creating the effects test).
For the purposes of this article, the pre-Morrison approach will be referred to as the "conduct and effects
test." But it should be noted that not all courts performed a joint assessment of conduct and effects. Compare
Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a combination of the "conduct
test" and "effects test" provides a better sense of whether sufficient U.S. contacts exist for a section 10(b)
claim), and Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 n.8 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a comprehensive approach does a better job of measuring U.S. contacts), with Robinson, 117 F.3d at 905 (explaining that
either the conduct test or the effects test may "independently establish jurisdiction"), and Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at
30 (offering the conduct and effects analyses as two instances where jurisdiction may be exercised over securities transactions that were not consummated in the United States). For a comparison of the regulatory systems in place in the world's major markets, see Marc I. Steinberg & Lee Michaels, Disclosure in GlobalSecurities
Offerings: Analysis of JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. IN-T'L L. 207 (1999).
8. See In re CP Ships, 578 F.3d at 1313; Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170.
9. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
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candy contributed" to the harm.' 0 When foreigners suffered losses abroad, however, the
acts occurring in the United States must have "directly caused" the harm." In the latter
instance, acts in the United States that were "merely preparatory" did not satisfy the conduct test. 12 The Fifth,13 Seventh,14 and D.C. Circuits 5 adhered to the Second Circuit's
approach, while the Third, 16 Eighth,1 7 and Ninth' 8 Circuits embraced more relaxed
standards.
The effects analysis, on the other hand, asked "whether the wrongful conduct had a
substantial effect in the United States." 19 The Second Circuit created the effects test
based on the belief that Congress intended to protect U.S. investors who acquired foreign
securities in U.S. markets and to protect U.S. markets from improper foreign conduct
affecting U.S. securities. 20 For instance, in Scboenbaum v. Firstbrook,21 a case involving
securities of a Canadian corporation, the Second Circuit exercised jurisdiction where the
transactions at issue had occurred in Canada but impacted the value of common shares
trading on a U.S. exchange. 22 The court asserted that application of section 10(b) was
"necessary to protect American investors." 23

10. Id. at 992-93. For instance, in Berseb, the court concluded that jurisdiction existed where a prospectus
emanating from the United States led to a fraudulent offering to U.S. investors abroad. Id. at 992.
11. Id.; see, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding direct
causation where the alleged fraud was completed through trades on U.S. commodities exchanges).
12. Berscb, 519 F.2d at 992 (noting that "[wihile merely preparatory activities in the United States are not
enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient
when the injury is to Americans so resident").
13. Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997) (referring to the presumption against extraterritoriality and stating that policy arguments may provide reason for Congress, but
not the courts, to expand federal jurisdiction).
14. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Steinberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Second Circuit
test provides an appropriate balance between the caution that should be exercised in finding extraterritorial
application and the concern that the United States is not used as a base for fraudulent operations).
15. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (considering the presumption
against extraterritorial jurisdiction and the "preservlation] [of] American judicial resources for adjudication of
domestic disputes and enforcement of domestic law").
16. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cit. 1977) (asking whether "at least some activity designed to
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country").
17. Cont'l Grain (Austi.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (inquiring
whether "defendants' conduct in the United States was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its accomplishment").
18. Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Eighth Circuit's test in
Continental Grain).
19. Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). See also Robinson v. TCI/US
West Comnc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits considered whether the effects were foreseeable and
substantial. See Kautbar, 149 F.3d at 665; Cont'l Grain, 592 F.2d at 416.
20. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting the district court's conclusion
that the Exchange Act did not apply to transactions outside of the territorial United States).
21. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. Id. at 208-09 (explaining that fraud upon the foreign corporation reduced its equity and resulted in
decreased stock value on U.S. exchanges).
23. Id. at 206.
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For over forty years, the conduct and effects test was applied and refined by the lower
federal courts. 24 Not surprisingly, some commentators criticized the unpredictable and
inconsistent application of section 10(b) under the test. 25 In 2010, in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court altered the course of federal securities law con26
cerning transnational securities fraud.
B.

TiE STORM STRIKES-THE MORRISON DECISION

Morrison was a "foreign-cubed" case-or rather-a case where foreign investors sued a
foreign issuer under U.S. securities laws for securities transactions on a foreign exchange. 27 In 1998, National Australia Bank Ltd. (National Australia) purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a Florida-based mortgage servicing company that
received fees for collecting mortgage payments. Because HomeSide would not receive
fees once a mortgage was fully paid, the value of HomeSide's right to receive such fees
diminished as mortgages were paid off early. Three years later, National Australia had to
write down the value of HomeSide's assets by $1.2 billion. National Australia explained
that it had not anticipated the lowering interest rates and related refinancings. The price
of National Australia's ordinary shares, which were listed on the Australian Stock Exchange Limited (ASX), and its American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), 2s which were listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), subsequently fell. Australian and American
investors then sued National Australia, HomeSide, and their insiders, alleging violations
of section 10(b).29 The plaintiffs claimed that the HomeSide defendants had manipulated
the rates of early repayment as "unrealistically low" with the objective of inflating the
24. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879-80 (2010) (detailing the history of the
conduct and effects test).
25. See, e.g., Erez Reuveni, Extraterritorialityas Standing:A Standing Theory of the ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2010); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman,
TransnationalLitigationand Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465, 467-68; Kun Young
Chuang, MultinationalEnforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of ExtraterritorialSuject-MatterJurisdiction,9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 102 (2003); Margaret Sachs, The
International Reach of Rule lOb-S: The Myth of CongressionalSilence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 687
(1990).
26. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869.
27. Id. at 2894 n.ll (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
28. As stated by the Third Circuit:
An ADR is a receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified amount of a
foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of the depositary, known
as the custodian. The holder of an ADR is not the title owner of the underlying shares; the tide
owner of the underlying shares is either the depositary, the custodian, or their agent. ADRs are
tradeable in the same manner as any other registered American security, may be listed on any of
the major exchanges in the United States or traded over the counter, and are subject to the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure for
American investors than trading in the underlying security in the foreign market.
Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2002). By purchasing ADRs, a U.S. investor can
gain ownership in the shares of a foreign company without the cross-border and currency inconveniences that
the investor would encounter if he instead purchased the shares on a foreign exchange. See generally Joseph
Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, Symposium: Entering the U.S. Securities Markets: Opportunities
and Risks for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM IINT'L L.J. S38, S42 (1994).
29. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
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ostensible value of the mortgage-servicing rights and that the National Australia defend30
ants were aware of this deception.
The district court dismissed the claims by the American investor in National Australia's
ADRs for failure to allege damages. 31 Because the American investor did not appeal, only
claims by the Australian investors in National Australia's ordinary shares traded on the
ASX were further considered. 32 The district court then granted defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the acts in the United States
were, "at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that
culminated abroad."33 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, stating that
the domestic acts did not "compris[e] the heart of the alleged fraud." 34 The Supreme
35
Court granted certiorari.
As a threshold matter, the Court held that the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b)
with regard to National Australia's conduct was a "merits" question under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), not a subject-matter jurisdiction question under FRCP
12(b)(1).36 This "merits"-based approach constitutes a radical departure from the subjectmatter jurisdiction rationale that had been overwhelmingly embraced by the lower federal
courts. 37 Perhaps equally as significant, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and effects test. 38
In determining whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim, the Supreme Court emphasized that unless Congress clearly expresses its affirmative intention "to give a statute extraterritorial effect," then the statute has no such application. 39 The Court asserted that
lower courts had disregarded this presumption against extraterritoriality by creating the
conduct and effects test to "discern" whether Congress would have wanted a statute to
apply.40 The Court explained the difficulties of applying the conduct and effects test, such
as having to decipher the degree of activity that transpired in the United States. 41 After
criticizing the unpredictable application of section 10(b) to transnational cases under the
30. Id.
31. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sees. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 2006).
32. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 n.I.
33. In re Natl AustI. Bank Secs. Litig., 2006 WL 3844465, at *8.
34. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cit. 2008)
35. Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 783 (2009) (mem.).
36. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77.
37. See Jared L. Kopel et al., CurrentTopics on Securities Litigation, in 1850 PRACTISING L. INST., CORP. L.
& PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 365, 391 (2010) (noting that "the Court swiftly swept away a halfcentury of lower courts treating the issue of extraterritorial reach of the securities law as a question of subject
matter jurisdiction"). See, e.g., Morrison, 547 F.3d at 171; Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc'ns Inc., 117
F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cit. 1998). For
further discussion, see infra notes 65-109 and accompanying text.
38. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2877-83.
39. Id. at 2877 (commenting that various courts had been using this approach for decades).
40. Id. at 2878.
41. Id. at 2879. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cit. 1975) (distinguishing
between U.S. and foreign investors); I1T v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cis. 1975) (stating that
"mere preparatory activities" do not warrant extraterritorial application).
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conduct and effects test, the Court reasoned that applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in all cases provides stability moving forward.42
Next, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had legislated that section
10(b) applies abroad. 43 The Court held that the "general reference to foreign commerce
in the definition of 'interstate commerce' does not defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality." 44 Congress's observations, when setting forth the purposes of the Exchange Act, that "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest" and
that the "prices established and offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and
quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries" also failed to overcome the
presumption. 45 Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that section 30(b) of the Exchange
Act-which specifically authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
promulgate regulations having extraterritorial application "to prevent ... evasion of the
Exchange Act"-is evidence that the whole Exchange Act applies extraterritorially.46 Disagreeing, the Court concluded that section 30(b) appeared to be "directed at actions
47
abroad that might conceal a domestic violation."
As an example of "a clear statement of extraterritorial effect," the Court focused on
section 30(a) of the Exchange Act. 48 That statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer ... to make use of the mails or of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an
exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws
of, or has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis49
sion may prescribe.
The Court noted that even where a statute, such as section 30(a), has some "extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision

42. See Morrison,130 S. Ct. at 2881 (criticizing "judicial-speculation-made-law" applying U.S. extraterritorially). The Court also specifically disapproved of Leasco and Scboenbaum-the cases from which the Second
Circuit developed its conduct and effects test. Id. at 2887; Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
43. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881-83.
44. Id. at 2882 (discussing the definition of "interstate commerce" in the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§78c(a)(17) (2010)).
45. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b).
46. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869
(No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719337 (contending that "[this] exemption would have no function if the Act did
not apply in the first instance to securities transactions that occur abroad").
47. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
48. Id. at 2883. The Court remarked that this provision providing for "a specific extraterritorial application
would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions on foreign exchanges." Id.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2010).
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to its terms."5 0 The Court concluded that there was not a sufficient basis to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality for section 10(b).51
Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) was
immaterial in this instance because they only sought domestic application concerning the
alleged financial manipulations and public statements of HomeSide that occurred in Florida. 52 In response, the Court commented:

Mt is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with
the territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
53
domestic activity is involved in the case.
The Court thus reasoned that the Exchange Act focuses on purchases and sales of se54
curities in the United States, not on the location where the deception occurs. If indeed
Congress had intended for the Exchange Act to apply to conduct affecting transactions
consummated abroad, the Court stated that "it would have addressed the subject of con55
flicts with foreign laws and procedures."
The Court thereupon enunciated the "transactional test" for the invocation of section
10(b).56 Under this test, for section 10(b) to apply, "the purchase or sale [must be] made
57
in the United States, or (must] involve[ ] a security listed on a domestic exchange." Be50. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2883.
51. Id. (holding that "[iln short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies
extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not").
52. Id. at 2883-84.
53. Id. at 2884 (emphasis in the original).
54. Id. (applying the same mode of analysis used in EEOC v. ArabianAmerican Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 266
(1991)).
55. Id. at 2885.
56. Id. at 2886 (describing the test as a clear test that would not interfere with foreign securities regulation).
57. Id. The Court explained that the prologue of the Exchange Act supported the significance of the
domestic exchange with its goal of "provid[ing] for the regulation of securities exchanges." Id. at 2884.
Moreover, the Court stated that it knew of no one who thought the Exchange Act was meant to regulate
foreign exchanges. Id. As for domestic purchases and sales, the Court referred back to section 30(a) and (b),
noting that, in each instance, the foreign location of the transaction "establishes (or reflects the presumption
of)the Act's inapplicability, absent regulations by the Commission." Id. at 2885. The Court rejected the
Solicitor General's suggested test, which would have provided section 10(b) coverage when the "fraud involves significant conduct in the United States," primarily because the test lacked textual support. Id. at 2886.
The Solicitor General stated that this test would "prevent[ ] the United States from becoming a 'Barbary
Coast' for malefactors perpetrating frauds in foreign markets." Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16-17, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL
719337). In response, the Court stated that there is no evidence that the United States was on this path,
though "some fear that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers
representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets." Id.
Note that in certain circumstances, the SEC may be able to institute suit under section 17(a) of the Securities Act when there are illegal offers to sell in the United States. Because section 17(a) extends to both offers
and sales, a domestic offer (even when the transaction is consummated abroad) comes within section 17(a)'s
coverage. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Significantly,
section 17(a) is solely a government enforcement tool. There is no private right of action under that statute.
See, e.g., Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1992); Sears v. Likens, 912 F. 2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990);
Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F. 2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). For analyses of section 17(a), see Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) oftbe
Securities Act After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J.163 (1979).
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cause the plaintiffs in Morrison did not purchase or sell securities listed on a domestic
exchange, and because the transactions at issue did not otherwise occur in the United
States, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim and accordingly
8
affirmed dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(6).5
Overall, Morrison contains three significant holdings: the abrupt characterization of extraterritoriality as a merits question; the determination that section 10(b) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality (with the related rejection of the conduct
and effects test); and the creation of the transactional test. Before the impact of these
holdings is examined, however, this article addresses Congress's response to the limitations pronounced in Morrison.
C.

A

PRESCRIPTION FOR THE STORM-THE

SEC-DOJ

DODD-FRANK AMENDMENT

One day after the Court released its Morrison decision, Congress enacted section 929P
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Exchange Act for actions brought by the
SEC and the U.S. government, such as the Department of Justice (DOJ).59 Specifically,
the statute provides:
(c) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.-The district courts of the United States and the
United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a
violation of [the antifraud provisions of this title] involving58. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment
only. See id. at 2888-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens stated that the judge-made
rules in U.S. securities law were invited by Congress when it deliberately created, and subsequently left intact,
an open-ended statute. Id. at 2889-90. He contended that Second Circuit case law had been thoughtfully
developed over several decades, had gained the "tacit approval of Congress and the Commission," and, thus,
ought to be favored by the Court. Id. at 2890-91. Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for limiting his
search for an indication of extraterritorial application to statutory text. Id. at 2891-92 (explaining that "all
available evidence about the meaning" of a provision should be considered to effectuate Congress's will regarding extraterritorial application). In any case, Justice Stevens argued that it was not appropriate to discard
the conduct and effects test based on the presumption against extraterritoriality because the test turns on the
presence of sufficient domestic contacts in transnational securities fraud, not the complete absence of domestic
contacts. Id. at 2892. Justice Stevens found that the statutory text in section 10(b) and section 30(a) and (b)which the majority held had no clear indication of extraterritorial application-offered strong indication that
the Act covers at least some transnational frauds. Id. at 2893-94 n.9. Justice Stevens then stated that the real
problem with the majority's opinion is that its test for domestic application is based on the belief that transactions on domestic exchanges, rather than the interests of the public and investors, are the focus of the Exchange Act. Id. at 2894 (quoting Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147
F.3d 118, 125 (2d. Cir. 1998)). He pointed out that the transactional test created by the majority would leave
an unsophisticated U.S. retiree who bought shares on a foreign exchange without a section 10(b) remedy even
if, on the basis of material misrepresentations, the purchase was induced in the United States by a U.S.
subsidiary of the issuer. Id. at 2895. With regard to the facts in Morrison though, Justice Stevens concluded,
"this case has Australia written all over it." Id.; see generally Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia
Bank and the Future of ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.537 (2011);
Elizabeth Cosenza, ParadiseLost: § 10() After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 343
(2011).
59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124
Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(c), 78aa(b) (2011)).
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(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside
the United States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable sub60
stantial effect within the United States.
According to floor comments made by the statute's sponsor, Representative Paul
Kanjorski, section 929P sought to nullify the presumption against extraterritoriality of the
antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws with regard to government-brought actions
by codifying the conduct and effects test repudiated by Morrison.61 Additionally, the
Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC perform a study and report to Congress within
eighteen months on whether the test set forth in section 929P should be extended to
62
private actions.
Congress therefore wrote a prescription to cure the ills of Morrison in the government
enforcement setting. Whether Congress in fact prescribed the proper medicine is uncertain. In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that extraterritorial application was a matter of
substantive law, not subject-matter jurisdiction. 63 Ignoring this rationale, Congress
framed section 929P in terms of jurisdiction. Thus, it remains to be seen whether Congress's efforts regarding SEC and DOJ actions will be effective. 64 Section 929P is discussed further in the next section, which examines the consequences of treating
extraterritoriality as a merits question and the implications of the abrupt departure from
the historical treatment of this subject.

M.

Divergent Waves-Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and the Merits

Extraterritoriality has traditionally been dealt with as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. 65 Morrison, however, held that this approach was not appropriate with regard to
60, Id.
61. 156 CONG. REC. H5234 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski). Note that other
criminal statutes may be invoked even if a subject transaction occurs abroad. For example, the federal wire
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, extends liability to those who use U.S. interstate wires to execute a proscribed scheme or antifraud to defraud. See Pascquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005).
62. Dodd-Frank § 929Y. The SEC request for comment considered international comity, as well as the
economic costs and benefits of including private actions for transnational securities frauds. SEcs. & ExcH.
CONsNI'N, No. 34-63174, STUDY ON EXTRATERRITORIAL PRIVATE RIGHT OFACTIONs 2, 5 (2010), available
at www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf. The Commission issued its report to Congress in April
2012. SEcs. & EXCH. COwM'N, STUDY ON THE CROss-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF AcTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECuerriEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (2012), available at http://www.

sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf. See infra notes 287-317 and accompanying text for discussion of the report and related public comments.
63. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2877.
64. For a discussion on section 929P as it relates to Morrison, see Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham, &
Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don't Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Etraterritorial
JurisdictionProvisionsof the Dodd-FrankAct, 20 MiNTN. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2011).
65. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.22 (1993) (the Sherman Act); EEOC. v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 266 (1991) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); In re CP Ships
Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1311-13 (1 th Cir. 2009) (section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Morrison, 547
F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cit. 2008) (same).
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section 10(b).66 The Court explained that to inquire about extraterritorial reach is really
to ask what conduct is prohibited under section 10(b), which goes to the merits of the
claim. 67 It stated that subject-matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court's
"power to hear a case."68 The differences between a jurisdictional and a merits challenge
are discussed below, followed by an exploration of the implications of this change beyond
section 10(b).
A.

ASSESSING THE STORM-CONSEQUENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL AND MERIT-BASED
CHARACTERIZATIONS

Classifying an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based can impact when a challenge may be
brought, who resolves the challenge, and the finality of the resolution.69 For example, a
motion based on subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, 70 whereas a challenge based on the merits is forfeited if not brought to the court in a timely manner. 71 An
instance where this timing may affect the outcome of a case is where a defendant raises an
issue for the first time on appeal.72 Such a challenge will likely be rejected as untimely if
the court determines that the issue is based on the merits, rather than that of subject73
matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, courts have an independent obligation to determine that subject-matter
jurisdiction exists but have no such obligation regarding merit requirements.74 Thus, a
court must inquire into such jurisdictional issues on its own accord. Characterization of
an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based also influences whether a judge or a jury will
resolve the dispute. 75 Particularly, a judge may weigh evidence concerning contested facts
66. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
67. Id.
68. Id. One commentator defined the difference saying, "Merits ask whether the defendant's conduct was
legally constrained (by the Constitution or by act of Congress); jurisdiction asks whether a federal court has
the power to enforce that legal constraint on the defendant's conduct." Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction
and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 671-72 (2005).
69. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-14 (2006) (discussing the consequences of characterizing a requirement as a subject matter jurisdiction issue or a merits-based issue).
70. Id. at 514.
71. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009) (stating that a "claimprocessing rule ... is ordinarily 'forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point'").
72. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court's
decision to vacate a jury verdict for the plaintiffwhere the defendant raised an issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time after the trial), rev'd, 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
73. See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504 (rejecting a challenge based on the merits of a claim because the
defendant had failed to raise the issue before the close of trial).
74. Id. at 514; compare FED. R. Csv. P. 12(h)(3) (stating that "[ilf the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action"), with FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(h)(2) (stating
that a "[flailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be raised: (A) in any pleading
allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial"). In determining that
the ERISA requirement that an employer has fifteen or more employees was a merits rather than jurisdiction
issue, the Supreme Court noted that the text of ERISA did not indicate that "Congress intended courts, on
their own motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement is met." Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.
75. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (referring to CHARLES WIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, 5B FEDERAL PRACTICE

& PROCEDURE § 1350 (3d ed. 2004)).
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to resolve a dispute concerning subject-matter jurisdiction, whereas a jury is the trier of
76
contested facts when an element of the claim is at issue.
The finality of a resolution may also depend on characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based. A dismissal due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction typically is
without prejudice, allowing a plaintiff to bring the claim in an appropriate court.77 But if a
claim is dismissed on the merits, the plaintiff would be precluded from arguing for a different outcome elsewhere.7S Furthermore, the court's characterization of the issue may
affect other claims. An appellate court must dismiss the entire complaint if subject-matter
jurisdiction is found lacking.79 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on the
other hand, allows the court discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant
issues. 80
These differences can potentially impact the outcome of litigation. With the exception
of potential claim preclusion, the characterization of an issue as merit-based appears to
favor plaintiffs. When an issue is deemed a merits question there is a limited time for
challenges by defendants, no independent judicial obligation to ensure that merit requirements are met, and a jury to resolve disputes concerning contested facts. It should be
noted, however, that a pretrial dismissal usually does not depend on characterization of an
issue as jurisdictional or merit-based, as evidenced in Morrison.8 1 National Australia raised
the issue of extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) before trial and therefore had not forfeited a challenge based on the merits. The Court found it unnecessary to remand the
case based on the Second Circuit's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction under
FRCP 12(b)(1), instead of dismissal for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6), rea82
soning that the new labeling would result in the same outcome.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court abruptly overruled decades of history treating section
10(b) extraterritoriality as an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The impact of this
change on extraterritorial securities litigation under section 10(b) is monumental. As discussed next, Morrison is already influencing the characterization of statutory requirements
of other federal statutes.
76. See id.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1) (2011) (providing an exception to claim preclusion
where "[tihe plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of
relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts").
78. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (noting that "a final judgment on the merits of an action

precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action").
79. Arbaugb, 546 U.S. at 514 (citing J. MooR ET AL., 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 106.6611] (3d
ed. 2005)).
80. Id. (explaining that this discretion stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
81. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd.,130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (reasoning that "[slince nothing in
the analysis of the courts below turned on the mistake, a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label
for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion"). See also ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d
954, 965 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that "[i]t is true that an appellate court may treat a Rule 12(b)(1) issue as a
Rule 12(b)(6) issue"); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
remand was unnecessary where the district court incorrectly discussed an ERISA matter for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, rather than failure to state a claim).
82. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2877 (citing Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
359, 381-84 (1959)).
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RIDING THE WAVES-IMPLICATIONS BEYOND SECTION

10(b)

The jurisdiction provision for the Exchange Act states:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the
Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder .... 63
There is thus no mention of extraterritoriality or any requirements regarding the scope
of section 10(b) in the foregoing statute. In Morrison, the Court stated that to establish
84
subject-matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only allege a violation of the Exchange Act.
s5
Other federal statutes with similarly worded jurisdictional provisions would be expected
to yield results identical to Morrison in the future-that is, characterization of an issue
regarding the statute's scope as a merits question.
Before Morrison, several circuit courts treated the requirements of the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), which limits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, as a jurisdictional issue.8 6 The Seventh Circuit noted that for six decades before
the enactment of the FTAIA, courts had treated application of the Sherman Act with

regard to foreign markets as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction and that legislation
should "be read to conform with Supreme Court precedent."87 Extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Act, without regard to the FTAIA, has also been characterized as a matter of
subject-matter jurisdiction.88 Justice Scalia strongly dissented to this characterization in
Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California, insisting that, "the extraterritorial reach of

the Sherman Act ... has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question
of substantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted
regulatory power over the challenged conduct." 89 After Morrison, Justice Scalia's approach may well emerge victorious. 90
Extraterritoriality is not the first issue to generate confusion over whether a decision
based on jurisdiction or the merits is appropriate. Until the Supreme Court resolved the
83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2011).
84. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aa in finding that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine whether section 10(b) applied to National Australia's conduct).
85. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2011) (Title VII) ("Each United States district court and each
United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought under this subchapter.").
86. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004); United Phosphorus
Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v.
HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cit. 2001). Dissenting in United Phosphorus Ltd., Judge Diane Wood
argued that the FTAIA language that the Sherman Act "shall not apply" to certain foreign conduct did not
speak to the court's power to consider the case. 322 F.3d at 954-55 (Wood, J., dissenting).
87. United Phosphorus Ltd., 322 F.3d at 951.
88. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.22 (1993).
89. Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit recently overruled its own precedent in determining that the FTAIA is a
merits-based limitation, rather than a jurisdictional one. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848
(7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (overruling United Phosphorus Ltd., 322 F.3d at 942). The Third Circuit has also
since held that the FTAIA goes to the scope of an antitrust claim. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466-69 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.
Ct. 2869 (2010), and Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).
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issue in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 9 1 there was a deep circuit split regarding whether the
definition of an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a jurisdictional or a merits issue. 92 The Fifth Circuit in Arhaugh held that fifteen or more employ93
ees were necessary to establish subject-matter jurisdiction of a Title VII claim. The
Supreme Court rejected this characterization and stated that the requirement was a merits
question. 94 Additionally, since Morrison, it has been contended that certain requirements
96
under other statutes, such as ERISA 95 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), should be characterized as merits questions.
All this is not to say that an issue that goes to the scope of the conduct covered under
the statute can never be a jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress has the power to make a threshold limitation on a statute's scope jurisdictional by
clearly identifying it as such. 97 To determine whether Congress has exercised this power,
the Court has focused on whether the threshold appears in the jurisdictional provision of
98
For example, the
the statute or if it is accompanied by any jurisdictional language.
amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
99
§ 1332 is an example of a requirement deemed jurisdictional by Congress. By contrast,
in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,100 the Supreme Court

held that a conferencing requirement under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) was not jurisdictional because it was "not moored" to the section of the RLA establishing
jurisdiction. 101
Had the conduct and effects test not been rejected in Morrison for substantive reasons,
the Dodd-Frank amendment arguably would have been successful in converting the test
into a jurisdictional requirement for cases brought by the SEC and DOJ. Notably, section
929P speaks extensively in jurisdictional language. 0 2 But in light of the substantive limitations set forth in Morrison, it may well be that the amendment futilely attempts to grant
103
jurisdiction beyond the substantive reach of the Exchange Act.
91. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
92. Wasserman, supra note 68, at 657 n.65 (2005) (listing cases from eight different circuit courts over the
past three decades).
93. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2004).
94. Arbaugb, 546 U.S. at 516. Because the plaintiff moved for dismissal based on subject-matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal, characterization of the issue as a merits question resulted in reinstatement of
the jury's decision against the plaintiff because there was not a timely motion to dismiss on the merits. See
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 446 F.3d 573, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2006).
Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010) (regarding whether an employ95. Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l
ment plan was subject to ERISA).
96. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
642 F.3d 268, 272 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (Leval, J., dissenting).
97. Arbaugb, 546 U.S. at 515.
98. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 130 S.Ct. 584, 597-99 (2009) (analyzing the
conferencing requirement under the Railway Labor Act); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (considering the employee-numerosity requirement under Tide Vi).
99. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.").
100. 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).
101. Id. at 597-99 (commenting that the two provisions were in separate sections).
102. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
Painter et al., supra note 64, at 4.
103. See, e.g.,
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A similar argument was made with regard to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)104 in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.10 5 The defendant argued that the ATS was "stillborn" because the jurisdictional grant did not have a corresponding cause of action. 106 The Supreme Court held
that federal common law at the time the ATS was passed in 1789 provided substantive law
to support the jurisdictional grant.' 07 In its decision, the Court considered evidence that
Congress intended the statute to have immediate effect upon enactment. 08
While Morrison clearly finds substantive law lacking for the conduct and effect test,
courts may draw from Sosa and proceed based on Congress's intent to overrule Morrison,
taking into account the brief period in which Congress had to respond to Morrison and the
lengthy history of courts treating extraterritorial application as a matter of jurisdiction.
Given the uncertainty surrounding section 929P though, Congress (at least in the government enforcement context) should expand the substantive reach of section 10(b) to help
ensure that the law is interpreted as Congress intended. 09
Overall, a significant impact of the Morrison declaration that section 10(b) extraterritoriality is a merits question is with respect to the characterization of the statutory requirements of other statutes. Future characterization of extraterritoriality appears particularly
susceptible to the reasoning in Morrison, though Congress's ability to make a requirement
jurisdictional means that courts cannot assume that a merits question under one statute is
necessarily a merits question under another statute. As for the future of the Dodd-Frank
amendment, the potential problems seem to lie in the substantive limitations of the Exchange Act, not with Congress's jurisdictional characterization of extraterritoriality. The
impact of Morrison's extraterritoriality analysis on other federal law is examined next.
IV. Wave Impact-Extraterritoriality with Regard to Other Federal Law
In Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
a canon of construction that applies generally to the legislation of Congress.I 0 The
Court explained that this presumption rests on the perception that Congress usually legislates with regard to domestic, rather than foreign, concerns."' Thus, unless Congress
clearly indicates that a statute has extraterritorial reach, courts should presume the statute
does not apply abroad. 112 While Morrison is not the first Supreme Court case to support
that general concept,' 13 its outcome may unleash a new wave of defendants challenging
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). In its entirety, the ATS states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.".Id.
105. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
106. Id. at 714.
107. Id. at 724.
108. Id.
109. Interestingly, the SEC has not relied on the Dodd-Frank amendment in post-Morrison cases. See SEC
v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp.
2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Because the less strict conduct and effects test should make it easier for the SEC to
bring section 10(b) actions, perhaps the SEC harbors doubts about its effectiveness.
110. Morrison v. Nat'l Aust]. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2878.
113. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("[L]egislaion of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."); see also Smith
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the extraterritorial application of federal statutes. To gain an understanding of how Morrison might impact other federal law, this section examines the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), a statute whose extraterritoriality is unsettled, and the
14
Lanham Act, a statute whose extraterritorial application was reinforced by Morrison.
A.

ROGUE WAVE-RICO

Prior to Morrison, several circuit courts adopted the conduct and effects test to determine the extraterritorial application of RICO.11S For example, the Ninth Circuit, upon
finding that RICO is silent as to extraterritorial application, reasoned that the securities
laws' conduct and effects test was useful in determining RICO's extraterritorial applicaion. 116 The Eleventh Circuit, after rejecting the assertion that RICO does not apply
extraterritorially without an explicit statement to that effect, also adopted the conduct and
effects test. 1 7 In United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,18 the District of Columbia Circuit applied the effects test in determining that RICO applied where a British tobacco
company was accused of deceiving U.S. consumers about the risks of smoking cigarettes. 119 But unlike the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the D.C. Circuit held that regulation of foreign conduct in such cases did not involve extraterritorial application, as the
120
United States has a "legitimate interest in protecting its citizens within its borders."'
The court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply when a
statute meets the effects test; rather, RICO would only have "true" extraterritorial reach if
it were able to reach "foreign conduct with no impact on the United States.' 2'
These pre-Morrison analyses likely do not hold up today. In Morrison, the Supreme
Court explained that the conduct and effects test stemmed from courts' misguided attempts to discern whether Congress would have wanted to apply section 10(b) even
though the statute was silent as to extraterritorial application. 2 2 Without clear statutory
v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (quoting Foley Brothers); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991) (same).
114. These two statutes were chosen for discussion because each had case law discussing extraterritoriality
prior to Morrison. Additionally, an analysis of RICO and the Lanhain Act allows for comparison of a statute
that likely does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality with one that does. For some of the
other statutes whose extraterritoriality has been examined after Morrison,see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d
736, 744 (9th Cit. 2011) (Alien Tort Statute); TianRui Group Co. v. InternationalTrade Commission, 661 F.3d
1322, 1328-32 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Tariff Act); United States v. Elie, No. S3 10 CRIM. 0336(LAK), 2012 WL
383403, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012) (Internet Gambling Business Act of 1970); Souryalv. TorresAdvanced
Enterprise Solutions, LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 835, 841-43 (E.D. Va. 2012) (Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993).
115. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Liquidation
Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008); Poulos v.
Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d
659, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1998) (opting to save determination on the extraterritorial scope of RICO for another
day).
116. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663.
117. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351-52.
118. 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cit. 2009).
119. Id. at 1105-06, 1130-31.
120. Compare id. at 1130, with Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663, and Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351-52.
121. Philip Morris, 566 F.3 d at 1130 (emphasis added).
122. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austd. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-81 (2010).
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indication that RICO was meant to apply extraterritorially, there is no reason to think that
this test would be any more appropriate in a RICO case. Indeed, based on Morrison and
the presumption against extraterritoriality, several courts have since concluded that RICO
does not apply extraterritorially.1 23 One district court, for example, specifically rejected
1 24
the conduct and effects test with regard to RICO "for the same reasons" as in Morrison.
The D.C. Circuit's assertion that the effects test is a test for domestic, rather than
extraterritorial, application is an interesting approach to RICO. While that particular test
may not survive Morrison, a workable test for domestic application of RICO involving
foreign contacts might yet be developed. In Morrison, by creating the transactional test,
the Supreme Court prescribed the domestic contacts necessary to establish a section 10(b)
claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently had the opportunity to develop a
minimum-domestic-contacts test for RICO claims but declined. In Norex Petroleum Ltd.
v. Access Industries,Inc., 125 Norex Petroleum Ltd. (Norex), a Canadian corporation, alleged
that the primarily foreign group of defendants was involved in a widespread racketeering
conspiracy aimed at taking over the Russian oil industry.126 Norex claimed that defendants violated RICO by laundering money and committing other acts in furtherance of this
scheme in the United States. 127 The defendants argued that Norex had failed to raise a
128
RICO claim because the principal actions had taken place outside of the United States.
The Second Circuit held, based on Morrison, that RICO did not have extraterritorial application. 129 In its analysis, the court stated that Morrison created a "bright-line rule" for
determining a statute's extraterritorial application: "absent a clear Congressional expres130
sion of a statute's extraterritorial application, a statute lacks extraterritorial reach."
After noting Second Circuit precedent holding that "RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial application," the court rejected each of Norex's arguments to the contrary. 13' Particularly, it held that: RICO's broad language defining commerce 132 did not indicate
123. See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010); Sorota v. Sosa,
842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2012); CGC Holdings Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1210
(D. Colo. 2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United States v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2011).
124. See In re Le-Nature's, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 V.L 2112533, at *2n.5(W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).
125. 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010).
126. Id. at 31. The defendants were primarily foreign actors, though several were U.S. citizens or conducted
304 F. Supp. 2d 570, 572-73
business in the United States. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc.,
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 416 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2005).
127. Norex, 631 F.3d at 31. Specifically, Norex asserted that U.S. and foreign banking facilities concealed
financial transactions to divert revenues on behalf of defendants. Norex Petroleum, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
128. Norex, 631 F.3d at 32.
129. Id. at 33. The separate mail and wire fraud statutes have extraterritorial application, however, and
should be available for criminal cases where a RICO claim is unavailable because RICO does not apply
extraterritorially. Kopel et al., supra note 37, at 398.
130. Norex, 631 F.3d at 32 (citing Morrison v. Nat'lAustl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).
131. Id. at 32.
132. RICO prohibits the use or investment of racketeering proceeds affecting "interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2011). The statute also prohibits a person from gaining or maintaining,
through racketeering activities, an interest in an enterprise affecting "interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
§ 1962(b).
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extraterritorial application; 33 the extraterritorial reach of RICO's predicate acts, such as
34
wire fraud, did not extend beyond the terms of those provisions to RICO as a whole;
and alleging some occurrence of domestic conduct was not enough to support domestic
application of RICO.135 Concluding that the slim domestic contacts alleged by Norex
were not enough to support extraterritorial application of RICO, the court dismissed the
claims under FRCP 12(b)(6).13 6 The court declined to discuss what domestic contacts
would have supported RICO application despite the foreign contacts. Subsequently, as
37
discussed below, a number of district courts have considered this question.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court indicated that any test for domestic application should
reflect the focus of the statute, 138 prompting several courts to perform a statutory analysis
of RICO.139 According to its statutory language, RICO does not criminalize racketeering
activities standing alone-those are criminalized under other statutes-rather, the statute
criminalizes racketeering activities in connection with an enterprise. 140 This has led sev-

41
eral courts to conclude that the focus of RICO is on the enterprise.'
The statute's purpose, which is stated as "the elimination of the infiltration of organized
42
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce,"'
supports this conclusion. The reference to interstate commerce suggests that Congress's

133. Norex, 631 F.3d at 33. "[We have repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad language in
their definitions of commerce do not apply abroad." Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882).
134. Id. "[Viqhile Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act... can be interpreted to apply abroad, 'the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its terms." Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
at 2882-83).
135. Id. "[]t is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of
the United States." Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884) (emphasis in original).
136. Id. Before the Morrison decision, the Second Circuit would have also engaged in an inquiry of whether
Congress "would have intended that federal courts should be concerned with specific international controversies." See N.S. Fin. Corp. v. AI-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996), overruled by Norex Petroleum Ltd.
v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010). Though the Second Circuit never settled on a specific test
under this inquiry for the extraterritorial application of RICO, it indicated that it might have found a variation of the securities laws' effects test appropriate. Id. at 1052 (commenting that the effects-oriented approach used in antitrust cases might be preferred in RICO cases as RICO's substantive law and damages has
similarities with parts of the Sherman Act).
137. See, e.g., In re Le-Nature's, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WJL 2112533, at *3 (WV.D.Pa. May 26, 2011); In re
Toyota Motor Corp, 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914-15 (C.D. Cal. 2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG)(VVP), 2011 WL 843957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (mem. op.); Cedefio v.
Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
138. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (examining the Exchange Act to identify the focus of congressional
concern).
139. See, e.g., Le-Nature's, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3; Toyota, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 914; European Crnty., 2011
VVL 843957, at *5-6; Cedeio, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2011).
141. See, e.g., Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Le-Nature's, 2011 WL 2112533, at
*3; Toyota, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 914; European Cmty., 2011 "VL 843957, at *5; Cededo, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
To determine the location of the enterprise in a RICO case, some courts have employed the "nerve center"
test, which inquires as to where the decision-makers are. See Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., No. 11-2861 SC, 2012 WL 1657108, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012); European Cmty., 2011 WL
843957, at *5-6. Not all courts, however, have agreed that the enterprise is the focus of RICO. See, e.g.,
CGC Holdings Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1209 (D. Colo. 2011) (finding that "racketeering
activity" is the focus of RICO).
142. STAFF OF S. CoMI.

ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., REP. ON ORGANIZED CRIME CON-FROL ACt

OF 1969, S. REi'. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969).
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principal concern was focused on the corruption of domestic enterprises. 143 It can be
argued that Congress would have addressed possible conflicts with foreign laws and procedures if RICO had been intended to apply to corruption abroad. 144 Thus, U.S. citizens
145
harmed by a foreign enterprise may not have recourse under RICO.
Undoubtedly, Morrison will continue to be mentioned in discussions of statutes like
RICO whose extraterritoriality is not yet settled.146 A conclusion that a statute does not
have extraterritorial reach is likely not enough to rule on a claim though, as shown by the
creation of the Morrison transactional test for domestic application of section 10(b). Next,
an analysis of the Lanham Act reveals similar shortcomings where a statute has been
deemed to have extraterritorial reach.
B.

SURFING THE WAVES-THE LANHAm ACT

The extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, which covers trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, was reinforced by Morrison.147 It may be instructive
in predicting the extraterritoriality of other federal laws after Morrison to understand the
background supporting this finding of extraterritoriality. Furthermore, it is worth noting
the tests that the federal appellate courts have developed limiting extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.
In 1952, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction existed in a Lanham Act case where
the alleged trademark infringement was consummated outside the United States. 48 In
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 149 Bulova Watch Co. (Bulova), a New York corporation, sued
Steele, a U.S. citizen, for stamping the name "Bulova" on watches that he assembled and
sold in Mexico. The Court stated that international law did not prevent the United States
from "governing the conduct of its own citizens ... in foreign countries when the rights of
other nations or their nationals are not infringed."'5O Based on the Lanham Act's "broad
jurisdictional grant," which included "sweeping reach into 'all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,"' the Court found legislative intent that the statute's scope
encompassed Steele's activities abroad.' 5 ' The Court explained that Steele's "operations
143. Additionally, in the prologue of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Act through which
RICO was enacted, Congress published findings that organized criminal activities in the United States weaken
the U.S. economy, "seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and
undermine the general welfare of the [United States] and its citizens." Pub. L. No. 91-452, intro., 84 Stat.
922, 923 (emphasis added). In Morrison, the Court referred to the prologue of the Exchange Act as supporting the importance of the domestic exchange in section 10(b). 130 S. Ct. at 2884-85.
144. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (refusing to find that the Exchange Act reaches foreign exchanges and
transactions because Congress would have addressed conflicts with foreign laws and procedures if the statute
were intended to apply abroad).
145. This outcome would not be unlike the potential harsh realities of the section 10(b) transactional test.
See infra notes 194-286 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., NewMarket Corp. v. Innospec, Inc., No. 3:10CV503-HEH, 2011 WL 1988073, at *3-4 (E.D.
Va. May 20, 2011) (discussing the extraterritoriality of the Robinson Patman Act, an anti-price discrimination
statute).
147. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 n.il.
148. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952). In deciding that jurisdiction existed, the Court
did not find it necessary to pass on the merits of the claim. Id. at 283.
149. 344 U.S. 280, 281-82 (1952).
150. Id. at 285-86.
151. Id. at 286-287. The Court remarked,
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and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation" because Steele bought some of the watch parts in the United States, and some of the watches
made their way into the United States. 152 Furthermore, the Court noted that affording
Bulova relief would not "impugn foreign law," because Mexico's courts had nullified
Steele's trademark registration of "Bulova" in Mexico.' 53 Significantly, in Morrison, the
Supreme Court cited Steele for the proposition that the Lanham Act applies
54
extraterritorially.
Lower courts subsequently created tests to determine when extraterritorial application
was proper under the Lanham Act. 155 As in Morrison, settling the inquiry into extraterritoriality was not enough 56 Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Steele, the Second
Circuit adopted a three-factor test that asks: (1) whether the subject defendant is a U.S.
citizen; (2) whether such defendant's conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce;
157
and (3) whether relief would create a conflict with foreign law.
While the Fourth,1s8 Fifth, 159 and Eleventh 160 Circuits have adopted the Second Circuit test with some variation, the First Circuit adheres to a standard based on the Supreme
Court's test for extraterritorial application under the antitrust laws.' 6 ' That court explained that both antitrust and trademark law carry the risk, absent some extraterritorial
enforcement, that violators who have harmed U.S. commerce may evade legal authority
altogether.162 The First Circuit test requires a lesser showing of effects when the defen[Tihe United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct
of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other
nations or their nationals are not infringed. With respect to such an exercise of authority there is
no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes
the duty of the citizen in relation to his own government.
Id. at 285-86 (citing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
152. Id. at 286.
153. Id. at 289.
154. Morrison v. Nat'l Aust. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 n.11 (2010) (rejecting the reading that Steele
merely applied a non-extraterritorial statute based on U.S. conduct).
155. See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2005); Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech
Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1992); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642
(2d Cir. 1956).
156. See Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2880.
157. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642. In Steele, the Supreme Court noted that the effects of Steele's conduct
reached the United States but never described the effects as "substantial." See Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-87. The
language appears to have been derived from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in the case. See id. (citing Bulova
Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1952)). The Fifth Circuit quoted commentary accompanying the
Lanham Act that stated that the statute covers trademark uses in foreign, territorial, or interstate commerce,
as well as uses in intrastate commerce that have a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."
Steele, 194 F.2d at 570 (citing Daphne Robert, Commentayy on the Lanham Act, 268-69 (1948)).
158. See Nintendo, Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring significant, rather
than substantial, effects).
159. See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 327, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2008) (suggesting
that "some" effects might be sufficient).
160. See Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l., Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2001).
161. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2005) (allowing the test in Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), to guide its analysis of the proper extraterritorial reach under the
Lanham Act).
162. Id. at 119.
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dant is a U.S. citizen 163 and disregards the conflict-of-law inquiry. 164 The Ninth Circuit
similarly created a test based on antitrust law,165 which it recently applied inLove v.Associated Newspapers, Ltd.,166 making it the first federal appellate court to consider extraterrito-

rial application of the Lanham Act since Morrison.
In Love, Mike Love, a band member of The Beach Boys, 167 claimed that the marketing
and distribution of a CD in the United Kingdom and Ireland infringed on his limited
exclusive right to use The Beach Boys trademark in live performances. 16 After acknowledging the requirement in Morrison for a "clear indication of an extraterritorial application,"169 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Lanham Act's "sweeping
language ... expressly covering all commerce Congress can regulate" from the Exchange
Act's mere mention of "foreign commerce."' 7 0 The court found it unnecessary to reevaluate its case law concerning the Lanham Act's coverage of foreign activities. 171 Accordingly, the court turned to its three-factor test for proper extraterritorial application under
that Act, which provides that:
(1) the alleged violations must create some effect on American foreign commerce; (2)
the effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs
under the Lanham Act; and (3) the interests of and links to American foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify asser72
tion of extraterritorial authority.
Applying the test, the court held that "all relevant acts occurred abroad" 173 and that
Love failed to provide evidence of monetary injury in the United States caused by such
acts. 174 The CD was conceived and manufactured overseas and was never sold or distributed in the United States. 175 Therefore, although the Lanham Act was deemed to have
extraterritorial application, the claims in Love were dismissed based on the Ninth Circuit's
176
test limiting the extent of that application.
163. Id. at 118 (commenting that when the defendant is a U.S. citizen, "the domestic effect of the international activities may be of lesser importance and a lesser showing of domestic effects may be all that is
needed"). Cf.id. at 120 ("We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial
conduct by foreign defendants only where the conduct has a substantial effect on United States commerce.")
(emphasis added).
164. Id. at 120. The First Circuit stated that comity considerations should be analyzed as a prudential,
rather than extraterritorial, question. Id. at 121.
165. Reebok Intern., Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. PJ. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir.1985)).
166. 611 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2010).
167. The Beach Bays: The Complete Guide, www.beachboys.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
168. Love, 611 F.3d at 612-13. In a bit of humor, the court quipped, "Love wishes they could all be California torts." Id. at 608.
169. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
170. See Love, 611 F.3d at 612 n.6.
171. Id. at 613.
172. Id. at 612-13. The Ninth Circuit noted that the test originated was originally developed for antitrust
law. Id. at 613.
173. Id.
174. Id. (refusing to hold that Love's ticket sales in the United States suffered due to the CD since the
alleged confusion would have occurred overseas).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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A number of observations can be made concerning the various courts' treatment of the
Lanham Act's extraterritorial application. The Love decision offers a glimpse of a statute
that has been deemed to have extraterritorial application in large part due to its definition
of "commerce."' 177 When the petitioners in Morrison argued that section 10(b) applied
abroad because "interstate commerce" was defined to encompass "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication... between any foreign country and any state," the Court
responded that it has repeatedly held that statutes with broad language defining "commerce" do not have extraterritorial application, even in instances where "foreign commerce" was expressly included in the definition.' 78 Yet, the Lanham Act has been deemed
to have extraterritorial application based on its invocation of the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. 179 It is not readily apparent what areas of foreign commerce are covered
under the Commerce Clause that would not also be covered by the Exchange Act's definition of "commerce," or any other statute's similarly-worded definition of "commerce."' i 0
Nonetheless, when considered together, Morrison and the extraterritorial reach of the
Lanham Act suggest that a clear indication of extraterritorial application will not be found
based on a statute's definition of "commerce" unless the statute expressly calls upon the
full extent of Congress' power over commerce.' 8'
Additionally, the transactional test created in Morrison and the tests created by the federal circuit courts to determine the scope of the Lanham Act's extraterritorial application
together indicate that the proper application of a particular statute requires a more indepth analysis. 8 2 Thus, Morrison sets the stage for a two-step analysis asking: (1) Does the
subject statute contain a clear indication of extraterritorial application?; and (2) What is
the proper scope of its domestic (or extraterritorial) application? 8 3 The second question,
from which the Morrison transactional test' 84 and the tests developed by the federal circuit

177. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252-53 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077.
178. Morrison v. Nat'l
Austi. BankLtd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17)). For
examples of statutes with broad language defining "commerce" not found to have extraterritorial application,
see ArabianAmerican Oil, 499 U.S. at 252-53 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); McCullocb v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (National Labor Relations Act); and New York
Central Railroad Co. v. Cbisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925) (Federal Employers' Liability Act).
179. SeeLove, 611 F.3d at 612 n.6.
180. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.3 ("Congress shall have the power ... [tlo regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes."), with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17)
(2010) ("The term 'interstate commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between any State and any place or ship
outside thereof. The term also includes intrastate use of: (A) any facility of a national securities exchange or
of a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.").
181. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882.
182. With regard to the Lanham Act though, practitioners should keep in mind that the Supreme Court has
yet to hear a case involving the proper scope of extraterritorial application under the Act and therefore has
not endorsed any of the federal appellate court tests.
183. A recent case on the extraterritoriality of RICO actually broke its discussion into two parts: "Whether
RICO Applies Extraterritorially," and "Whether [Defendantl Seeks Extraterritorial Application." See Sorota
v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348-49 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
184. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2884-86 (inquiring into the proper domestic application of section 10(b)).
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courts for the Lanham Act' 85 emerged, gets to the heart of the matter-the proper application of the statute.
Stating that a statute has extraterritorial application when, in reality, that application is
limited by considerations of U.S. connections may not be significantly different than stating a statute does not have extraterritorial application when, in reality, so-called domestic
application of the statute allows for foreign contacts so long as certain U.S. requirements
are met. 186 In both instances, it is the specific degree and type of U.S. contacts necessary
to state a claim that really matters.' 8 7 Thus, the essential question is what are the minimum U.S. contacts necessary, if any, to state a claim under the applicable statute. The
presumption against extraterritoriality would then only be applied once-in the court's
statutory analysis when answering this question.' 88
Though the analysis in Morrison likely ensures that courts will first look to see if a
statute has a clear indication of extraterritorial application, the more important battleground seems to be the second set of tests outlining proper application of a statute where
both U.S. and foreign contacts are involved. Indeed, concurring in the Morrison judgment, Justice Stevens commented that "[t]he real motor of the Court's opinion, it seems,
is not the presumption against extraterritoriality but rather the Court's belief that transactions on domestic exchanges are 'the focus of the Exchange Act' and 'the objects of [its]
solicitude.' ,89

Overall, even though the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a new canon of
statutory construction, Morrison has created a more difficult environment for plaintiffs to
bring claims involving U.S. and foreign contacts. Defendants will bring more FRCP
12(b)(6) challenges regarding extraterritorial application, asserting that either the statute
at issue does not have extraterritorial reach or that the U.S. contacts are insufficient to
state a claim. Indeed, in light of Morrison, use of the conduct and effects test in other areas
of law that are not "textually plausible"' 9 is susceptible to being overruled.' 91 The fature
185. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (laying out the test for proper
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act).
186. For instance, despite stating that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach, the Second Circuit looks
for U.S. citizenship and the effect on U.S. commerce when considering claims under the Act. Vanity Fair,
234 F.2d at 642. Additionally, the Morrison transactional test allows a claim under section 10(b), a statute
without extraterritorial reach, so long as the securities purchase or sale occurs on a domestic exchange or
otherwise is a domestic transaction. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887.
187. This is especially true in a time of globalization where an increasing number of cases involve both U.S.
and foreign contacts. For a different perspective on extraterritorial application, see United States v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2009), which defined "true" extraterritorial reach as "foreign
conduct that has no conduct on the United States" (emphasis added).
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78, 2884 (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality when
188. But see
determining the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) and again when determining the domestic activity
needed to state a section 10(b) claim). In response to the plaintiffs argument in Morrison for domestic application of section 10(b), Justice Scalia stated that the "presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application requires further analysis." Id. at 2884.
189. Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 2884 n.9 (majority opinion).
191. It should be noted, however, that in determining if a clear indication of extraterritorial application
exists, Morrison still allows courts to consult statutory context in deriving "the most faithful reading of the
text." Id. at 2883 (stating that a clear statement such as "this law applies abroad" is not necessary for a
statutory finding of extraterritorial reach). For instance, in a post-Morrison decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit stated that a clear expression of congressional intent that a statute apply abroad was
VOL. 46, NO. 3

TRANSNATIONAL DEALINGS

851

will likely be shaped by courts focusing on the language and objectives of a statute and
developing tests therefrom. 92 An absence of statutory direction regarding conflicts with
93
foreign laws will weigh in favor of a more limiting test.
In addition to these broader statutory inquiries, Morrison generated specific concerns
under the Exchange Act with respect to the effect of its new transactional test on section
10(b) actions. The next section discusses the two prongs of the Morrison transactional test
in detail, as well as the test's possible expansion in light of the recently completed DoddFrank study on section 10(b) private rights of action.

V. The New Wave-Section 10(b) Transactional Test
After deciding in Morrison that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not have extraterritorial application,194 the Supreme Court created a test to determine proper domestic
application under the Act where foreign contacts are involved.' 95 The Morrison transactional test requires either: (1) a purchase or sale of a security listed on a domestic exchange
196
While federal courts
or (2) a purchase or sale of a security made in the United States.
have already had occasion to interpret the Morrison transactional test in a variety of settings, 197 there are critical questions that remain unresolved. The analysis below begins
with an examination of the first prong of the Morrison transactional test.

needed to overcome

the presumption against extraterritoriality and that "[s]uch an intention ... may appear
on the face of the statute, but it may also be 'inferred from ... the nature of the harm the statute is designed
to prevent,' from the self-evident 'international focus of the statute,' and from the fact that 'limit[ing] [the
statute's] prohibitions to acts occurring within the United States would undermine the statute's effectiveness."' United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cit. 2010) (quoting United States v. Plummer, 221
F.3d 1298, 1310 (11 th Cit. 2000)) (considering whether the Torture Act had extraterritorial application), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1511 (2011).
192. One commentator concluded that Morrison "giv[es] courts total discretion to discern the 'focus' of any
given statute." AnthonyJ. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality,97 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1045-46
(2011). As evidenced in Morrison, there is room to debate the focus of the congressional concern of a statute.
Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (concluding that domestic exchanges and domestic transactions were the
primary concern of Congress), with id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that "public interest" and the
"interests of investors" were the focus of the Exchange Act). See also Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345,
1349 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (focus of RICO is "enterprise"), with CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, 824 F.
Supp. 2d 1193, 1209 (D. Colo. 2011) (focus of RICO is "racketeering activity").
193. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (majority opinion).
194. Id. at 2883.
195. Id. at 2886 (referring to the adopted test as the "transactional test").
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307,
1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (over-the-counter purchase agreement designating the United States as the place of
closing); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stock
purchase on a foreign exchange); Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753
F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stock purchase by a U.S. resident); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche
Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (over-the-counter swap agreements).
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THE FIRST WAVE-PURCHASE OR SALE OF A SECURITY LISTED ON A U.S.
EXCHANGE

Under the first prong of the Morrison transactional test, a purchase or sale of a security
listed on a domestic exchange is subject to section 10(b). 198 The inquiry under this prong
focuses on the circumstances in which the listing requirement is met. 199 In this respect,
there are two ways that foreign companies seek to access capital markets through U.S.
exchanges. First, ordinary shares, which are the foreign equivalent of common stock, may
2 00
Secbe listed on U.S. exchanges to trade as a U.S. company's stock normally would.
ond, ordinary shares of a foreign issuer may be represented on U.S. exchanges through
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs),201 which are securities that indicate ownership of
202
ordinary shares but avoid the currency complications of foreign investments.
After Morrison, plaintiffs have argued that so long as a company's shares are listed or
represented on a U.S. exchange, a purchase or sale of stock on a foreign exchange satisfies
the first prong of the transactional test.2 03 Courts have consistently rejected this argument, explaining that such an outcome would undermine Morrison's focus on domestic
exchanges.20 4 For instance, in In re Alstom SA, Securities Litigation,20 5 class members had
198. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
199. See generally Daniel Hemel, Comment, Isser Choice After Morrison, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2011)
(examining the courts' early interpretations of the first prong of the transactional test).
200. For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading directly on NYSE, go to: Listings Directory,
NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc-ny-overview.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012) (go to "Issue
Type" tab, select "Preferred Stock" from the Issue Type dropdown, and click on "NYSE-Listed Non-U.S.
Companies"). For more information on ADRs, see snpra note 28.
201. For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading through ADRs on the NYSE, go to: NYSE
Listings Directory, NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc-ny-overview.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012)
(go to "Issue Type" tab, select "ADS Preferred" from the Issue Type dropdown, and click on "NYSE-Listed
Non-U.S. Companies"). For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading through ADRs on NASDAQ,
go to: NASDAQ International Companies, http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/nonUSoutput.asp (last visited Sept.
20, 2012).
202. See Velli, supra note 28, at S39. SEC requirements differ for each type of ADR, which include: Level
1-unsponsored or sponsored, limited to over-the-counter trading; Level 11-sponsored by the issuing company, listed on U.S. exchange; Level Ill-sponsored by the issuing company, listed on U.S. exchange, can
conduct a public offering; Rule 144A-sponsored, limited to private placement with qualified institutional
buyers. DR Basics and Benefits, BNY MELLON, http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr-edu-basics-and benefits.
jsp#ldr (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). For an in-depth discussion of ADRs and Morrison, see Vincent M.
Chiappini, How American Are American Depositary Receipts? ADRs, Rule lOb-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1795 (2011).
203. See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sees. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(ordinary shares represented by ADRs on NYSE); In re Alstom SA Sees. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471-72
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); Sglambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ordinary shares
directly listed on NYSE).
204. See, e.g., In re UBS Sees. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225 (RJS), 2011 WL 4059356, at *4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2011); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sees. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Royal Bank
of Scot., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73. Note, however, that in this situation,
plaintiffs may be able to institute suit under section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(2011). Section 18(a) allows for a private right of action based on a materially false or misleading statement
contained in any document filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act. The statute has strict reliance and
loss causation requirements. Nonetheless, the statute should prove useful for investors who purchase (or sell)
securities on a foreign exchange of a company whose shares also are listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Such
issuers must file Exchange Act reports with the SEC. See MARc I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURI-
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their section 10(b) action dismissed where their purchases of a French company's shares
occurred on a foreign stock exchange, despite the fact that the company's ADRs traded on
the NYSE.206 The court explained that Morrison was "concerned with the territorial location where the purchase or sale was executed and the securities exchange laws that governed the transaction." 207 Similarly, in Sglambo v. McKenzie, 208 where a Canadian
company's shares traded both on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), the court summarily dismissed class members who had only
purchased or sold common stock on the TSE.209 Overall, in determining whether a
purchase or sale involves a security listed on a U.S. exchange, the lower courts uniformly
have based their holdings on the territorial location of the exchange where the transaction
at issue occurred.
This territorial application is consistent with the directives expressed in Morrison, focusing on "purchases and sales of securities in the United States."210 Indeed, if the transactional test could be met so long as stock that was purchased or sold on a foreign exchange
had an identical or similar security listed on a U.S. exchange, one would have expected
Morrison's outcome to be different because National Australia had ADRs listed on the
NYSE.211
Consistent with Morrison, courts have allowed purchases or sales of ADRs made on a
U.S. exchange to proceed. 212 This is not to say all ADR purchases necessarily are within
section 10(b)'s scope. There has been some disagreement as to whether a purchase or sale
of an ADR that trades over-the-counter satisfies the Morrison transactional test.213 The
next section, which discusses purchase or sales in the United States that do not occur on
U.S. exchanges, will examine this situation further.
TIES LAW 300-01 (5th ed. 2009); Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States Courts By Purchasersof Foreign Listed
Securities in the Aftermath ofMorrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 7 HAs'r[NC.s Bus. L.J. 223, 261-262
(2011).
205. 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
206. Id. at 471-72 (concerning ordinary shares purchased on the Euronext Paris Exchange).
207. Id. at 472-73 (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)). See also
Vivendi Universal, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 527-34 (dismissing claims based on trades of a French company's ordinary shares on the Paris Bourse exchange, although shares were listed for non-trading purposes in support of
ADRs on the NYSE).
208. 739 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
209. Id. at 487. See also In re Celestica Inc. Sees. Litig., No. 07 CV 312(GBD), 2010 WL 4159587, at *1 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010) (disallowing purported class members who purchased Canadian defendant's stock
on the TSE, although it also traded directly on the NYSE), rev'd on other grounds, 455 F. App'x 10 (2d Cir.
2011).
210. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (emphasis added). "We know of no one who thought that the Act was
intended to 'regulatfel' foreign securities exchanges .
I d.
211. Id. at 2875-76.
212. See, e.g., Vivendi Universal,765 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31 (allowing the section 10(b) claim of both U.S. and
foreign class members who purchased ADRs listed and traded on the NYSE to proceed); Stackhouse v. Toyota
Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), 2010 WVL 3377409, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (mem.)
(analyzing Morrison and then appointing a pension fund as the lead plaintiff, because the fund, which had
purchased ADRs, suffered the largest loss).
213. See, e.g., In re Soci&te Ginhrale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (noting in support of a section 10(b) dismissal that the ADRs of a French company
were not traded on a U.S. exchange).
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Overall, the listing of foreign stock directly, or the representation of foreign stock
through ADRs, on a U.S. exchange alone is not enough to warrant section 10(b) coverage
under the Morrison transactional test. To satisfy the listing requirement of the first prong
of the test, courts have required that the transaction at issue take place on a U.S. exchange.
Purchases of ADRs on a domestic exchange come within section 10(b) coverage. On the
other hand, U.S. investors who purchase or sell securities outside of this country, whether
on a stock exchange, over-the-counter, or in private transactions, are left without a section
10(b) claim unless they can show that, pursuant to the second prong of the transactional
test, the purchase or sale was made in the United States. The next section explores the
scope of transactions covered by the second prong.
B.

A MORE TUMULTUOUS WAVE-PURCHASE OR SALE OF ANY OTHER SECURITY
IN THE UNITED STATES

The second prong of the Morrison transactional test raises a host of questions. In addressing this prong, the Supreme Court referenced "purchases or sales made in the United
States" as well as "domestic transactions." 214 Unfortunately, this terminology fails to provide sufficient light on the type of transactions that qualify under the second prong. Perhaps due to this lack of guidance, there is already a wealth of case law interpreting this
2
terminology. 15
Many attempts by plaintiffs to satisfy the second prong of the Morrison transactional test
have failed. 216 One of the arguments not surprisingly rejected by courts is that a purchase
of stock on a foreign exchange is a domestic transaction because the purchase was made by
a U.S. resident.217 Nothing in Morrison indicates that for section 10(b) purposes the location of a transaction turns on a purchaser's residency or citizenship. 2 18 As one court observed, "a foreign resident can make a purchase within the United States, and a United
States resident can make a purchase outside the United States," but section 10(b) only
29
reaches the former. ' Indeed, ascertaining the reach of section 10(b) based on the U.S.
residency (or citizenship) of the complainant would inappropriately revive a primary com220
As a consequence, under Morrison's transacponent of the abandoned "effects" test.

214. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-86.
215. See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307,
1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011); Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Stackbouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1.
216. See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS,
2011 WL 1211511, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F.
Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469,
474-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F.
Supp. 2d 620, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
217. See, e.g., In re BP P.L.C. Secs. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 794 (S.D. Tex. 2011); In re UBS Secs. Litig.,
No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2011 WL 4059356, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp.
2d at 178; Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
218. Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
219. Id.
220. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (involving stock purchased on foreign exchange by a U.S. pension
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tional test, section 10(b) does "not extend to foreign securities trades executed on foreign
221
exchanges even if purchased or sold by American investors."
Place of injury has also been rejected as a basis for section 10(b) coverage under Morri222
son.
One court commented, "there is no textual or logical basis [in the Exchange Act]
for making injury a sufficient condition for the statute's application without the existence
of a domestic purchase or sale." 223 After Morrison, therefore, a U.S. investor injured in the
United States from a purchase or sale transacted abroad is without recourse under section
10(b).
Next, consistent with Morrison's rejection of the conduct test, courts have deemed the
place of deceptive conduct irrelevant to the transactional test. 224 For example, in SEC v.
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,225 the SEC referenced Goldman Sachs's actions in the United
States in an attempt to state section 10(b) claims that involved purchases of notes by a
German bank and sales of credit default swaps by a Netherlands bank. 226 The alleged
deceptive conduct included transmission of false and misleading marketing materials and
emails. The court dismissed the claims, explaining that domestic conduct is no longer the
test for section 10(b) liability.2 27 As Morrison reasons, "[s]ection 10(b) does not punish
deceptive conduct," but only transactions that take place in the United States that involve
deceptive conduct committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
2 28
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered."
Likewise, assertions that a transaction ought to be considered a domestic transaction
where the decision to invest was made in the United States have proven futile.2 29 Concluding that an investment decision in the United States to purchase stock has "no bearing
31
230
courts have rejected this argument.2
on where the stock was ultimately purchased,"
221. Id. at 625-26 (rejecting the claim of a U.S. retirement fund that had bought Swiss stock on a Swiss
exchange).
222. UBS Secs. Litig., 2011 VVL 4059356, at *8; Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79.
223. Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
224. See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the complaint includes "numerous instances of U.S.-based conduct" but fails to
allege that a purchase or sale occurred in the United States); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d
147, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The shortcoming of all of this U.S.-based conduct is precisely that-it is just
conduct."); Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 179. In Cornwell, the court discussed how, in Morrison, the
Supreme Court: discarded the conduct and effects tests, which valued "whether 'the harmed investors were
American or foreign;'" did not place importance on the place where the deceptive conduct began; and referred to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), a case where extraterritorial application was
rejected despite some domestic contacts. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (referring to Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879, 2884-85 (2010)).
225. 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
226. Id. at 147.
227. Id. at 158-61.
228. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2011)). Of course, section 10(b) also
prohibits "manipulative" conduct. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977); MARC L
STEINBERG, SECuRTrnEs REGULATION 414-25 (rev. 5th ed. 2009).
229. See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS,
2011 WL 1211511, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F.
Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (U.S. pension and retirement funds bought British stock on British and
Amsterdam exchanges); Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178. In In re Royal Bank of Scotland, plaintiffs also
noted that the decision was based on the advice of U.S.-based asset managers. 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
230. Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (citing plaintiffs rejected argument for section 10(b) coverage
in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
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One court reasoned that allowing claims just because "some acts that ultimately result[ed]
in the execution of the transaction abroad [took] place in the United States" would only
2 32

serve to revive the rejected conduct test.

Several plaintiffs have advocated a seemingly more persuasive position that also has met
with failure thus far, contending that purchase orders placed in the United States for stock
listed on a foreign exchange are domestic transactions under Morrison.233 As one court
reasoned, "the Exchange Act was not intended to regulate foreign exchanges" and that,
due to the potential for conflicts with foreign law, "United States securities laws should
defer to the law of the country where the security is exchanged. ' 234 Based on Morrison's
rationale, therefore, it may well be that transactions effected on foreign exchanges can
never be domestic transactions coming within section 10(b) coverage.
After having gone through the rejected bases for defining a domestic transaction-that
is, residency or citizenship, location where injury occurred, location of deceptive conduct,
location of investment decision, and location where the purchase orders were placed-it is
time to examine a basis that has yielded inconsistent responses from courts. The theory
that domestic transactions under the second prong of Morrison referred to "purchases and
sales of securities explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States" was first suggested and adopted in Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., 235 a memorandum opinion designating a lead plaintiff for a securities class action suit. 236 A decision from the Southern
District of New York subsequently accepted this interpretation of the Morrisontransaction
test,237 but that district has declined to consistently follow

it.238

To add to this division,

the District Court for the District of Colorado found Stackhouse's interpretation unpersuasive. 239 In Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Management Holdings, Ltd.,240 the court
pointed out that Morrison did not attribute any significance to the place of solicitation in
231. See, e.g., id.; Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 622, 627.
232. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
233. See, e.g., Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., No. CV 10-0922
DSF (AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (mem.). In In re BP P.L.C. Securities.
Litigation, plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to rely on the trading rules of the LSE to establish a domestic transaction. 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 794 (S.D. Tex. 2011). They explained that LSE's electronic trading network
could pair a third-party market maker in the United States with a U.S. investor and argued that this type of
transaction takes place in the United States, not in London. Id. at 795. The court replied, "carving out an
exception for the purchase of securities on the LSE because some acts that ultimately result in the execution
of a transaction abroad take place in the United States would be to reinstate the conduct test." Id. at 796.
234. Stackhouse,
2010 WL 3377409, at *1.See Plumbers' Union, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (rejecting a section
10(b) claim where a U.S. pension fund placed a purchase order in the United States for Swiss stock on a Swiss
exchange).
235. No. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (mem.) (emphasis
added).
236. Id. at *2.
237. Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
238. Compare id.(quoting Stackhouse), with SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158-61
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (failing to key in on the alleged solicitation by Goldman Sachs and instead dismissing two
section 10(b) claims because the SEC failed to allege that "any party incurred 'irrevocable liability' in the
United States").
239. Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS, 2011 VL
1211511, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding Stackhouse unpersuasive).
240. Id.
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24 1
Indeed, it is questionable whether any part of the transactional
reaching its holding.
test relies on solicitation, as this would rekindle aspects of the conduct test that the Su24 2
preme Court expressly overruled.

More recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has focused on
the notion of "irrevocable liability" rather than solicitation when considering domestic
243
transactions under Morrison. This treatment stems from an analysis of case law and the
statutory language of the Exchange Act performed by the court in Plumbers' Union Local
244
There, the court determined that a
No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co.
purchase under the Exchange Act occurs when the parties incurred "irrevocable liability"
245
to consummate the transaction.
In April 2012, the Second Circuit adopted a similar test for domestic transactions under
247
246
The court stated in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto that a
Morrison.
domestic transaction requires irrevocable liability to be incurred or title to be transferred
248
In discussing irrevocable liability, the court noted that the
within the United States.
definitions of the terms "purchase" and "sale" in the Exchange Act include any contract
2 49
The court explained that the point at which parties contractually
for such undertaking.
obligate themselves to take and pay for a security or deliver a security can be used to
250
determine the locus of that securities transaction.
The facts needed to satisfy the irrevocable liability analysis for domestic transactions
under Morrison are unresolved, as the post-Morrison cases using the analysis have been
25 1
or granted leave to amend the comeither dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts
25 2
In Absolute Activist Value MasterFund Ltd., the court suggested
plaint with further facts.
that facts regarding "the formation of the contracts, the placement of purchase orders, the

241. Id.
242. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) (overruling Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (1972), which involved fraudulent inducement from which the
conduct test arose). See also id. at 2885 ("[W]e reject the notion that the Exchange Act reaches conduct in this
country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad . . ").
243. See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Goldman Sacbs, 790 F. Supp. 2d. at 157-58.
244. 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
245. Id. at 177.
246. See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cit. 2012).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 68-69.
249. Id. at 67 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)-(14) (2011)). When construing the terms "purchase" and
"sale" under the Exchange Act, courts have asked when the subject party became "irrevocably bound" to buy
or sell the securities such that "his rights and obligations became fixed." Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d
895, 898 (7th Cir. 1981). See also DiLorenzo v. Murphy, 443 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that a
purchase occurs under the Exchange Act once the purchaser "fully and irrevocably pa[ys] for the securities");
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954) (explaining that a person is a purchaser under the Exchange Act when he "incur[s] an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock").
250. Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 68.
251. See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 533, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Plumbers'
Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
252. See Absohlte Activist, 677 F.3d at 71.
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passing of title, or the exchange of money" would help to show that the parties became
25 3
irrevocably bound or that the title passed in the United States.
It is also instructive to make note of one of the instances where the alleged facts were
found lacking. In SEC v. Goldman Sachs &' Co., 254 the SEC alleged that the securities
transaction at issue closed in New York.25 5 The court held, however, that there were no
256
It exfacts alleging that any party incurred irrevocable liability in the United States.
plained that, under Morrison, "the closing, absent 'a purchase or sale . . . made in the
United States,' is not determinative. ' 2 57 Thus, it appears that courts will not presume that
parties incurred irrevocable liability at the closing, even though that may often be the
2
case. 58
Other interpretations of "domestic transactions" under Morrison have considered the
location where the subscription agreements were accepted. 259 For instance, in Anwar v.
Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.,260 a case brought by foreign investors against Bernie Madoffis
foreign feeder funds, the plaintiffs argued that the second prong of the Morrison transactional test was met because, although they sent their subscription agreements to foreign
administrators, a transaction did not occur until the agreements were accepted in the defendants' New York offices. 26 1 With no securities purchases or sales "executed on a foreign exchange," the court stated that Anwar entailed a "novel and more complex
application of Morrison's transactional test."262 The court concluded that, given the
unique financial interests, transaction structures, and party relationships involved, more
facts were needed to determine if plaintiffs' purchases occurred in the United States. 263
To consider the location where the subscription agreement was accepted is consistent
with the irrevocable liability analysis. Acceptance of an agreement presumably forms a
contract that makes the parties liable to each other if they fail to pay for or deliver the

253. Id. at 70.
254. 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
255. Id. at 153.
256. Id. at 159-61.
257. Id. at 158-59 (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010)).
258. See BLACK's LA'V DICTIONARY 291 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "closing" as when "the transaction is
consummated").
259. See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS,
2011 WL 1211511, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss after concluding
that completion of the transaction did not occur until defendant accepted the subscription agreement in the
Cayman Islands); Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (mandating
further discovery before ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss where plaintiff's transactions were not on
foreign exchanges and where the subscription agreements were allegedly accepted in New York).
260. 728 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
261. Id. at 405.
262. Id. The court noted that the securities were "listed... [but] not actually traded" on a foreign exchange.
Id.
263. Id. For another case brought by Madoff's feeder funds with similar results, see In re Optimal U.S. Litigation, 813 F. Supp. 3d 351, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In that case, the court denied a defendant's motion to
dismiss, stating that a more fully developed factual record was needed to establish "where all of Plaintiffs'
shares were 'issued,' where they wired their subscription payments, what the statement 'WE BOUGHT FOR
YOUR ACCOUNT I\: NYS' means, and where their subscription agreements were 'accepted."' Id.
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security as promised.2 64 Thus, under this approach, a plaintiff who pleads facts alleging
that a private securities agreement was accepted in the United States may well satisfy the
irrevocable liability analysis for demonstrating a domestic transaction under Morrison.
Arguably, there are instances where courts have interpreted Morrison too broadly to
exclude certain privately placed securities transactions from section 10(b) coverage. 265 For
example, in Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE,266 the court considered
whether there was a substantive distinction between the placement of a buy order in the
United States for a security traded abroad, which it did not consider a "domestic transaction," and the execution of a swap agreement in the United States referencing foreign
stock.2 6 7 Plaintiffs argued that, although the Volkswagen ordinary shares underlying their
swap agreements traded on a German exchange, the agreements qualified as domestic
transactions under Morrison because they were signed in the United States. 268 The court
determined that the economic reality was that the swap agreements were "essentially
,transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,' and not 'domestic transactions' that merit[ed] the protection of [section] 10(b)."269 Referencing Morrison, the court
relied on the presumption against extraterritoriality and that the Exchange Act was not
intended to regulate foreign securities transactions. 270 The court concluded that "transactions in foreign-traded securities-or swap agreements that reference them-where only
the purchaser is located in the United States" are not covered by section 10(b).271
In a more expansive decision denying section 10(b) coverage, In re Soci~t6 Generale Securities Litigation,2 72 the court held that a transaction involving over-the-counter ADRs
was not a domestic transaction under Morrison.273 The court reasoned that "[t]rade in
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CoN-TRAcTs § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise or set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty.").
265. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(dismissing a section 10(b) claim where the swap agreement was executed in the United States but the underlying shares traded on a foreign exchange); In re Socit6 G~nirale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RM\B), 2010
WL 3910286, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (dismissing section 10(b) claims based on ADRs that were
not traded on a U.S. exchange).
266. 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (U.S. and foreign hedge funds, which were all managed from
New York, sued foreign companies under the Exchange Act.).
267. Id. at 474-76. A security swap agreement is a private contract that fluctuates in value based on the price
of the shares referenced within; it is not traded on any exchange.
268. Id. at 474.
269. Id. at 476.
270. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884-86 (2010)).
271. Id. ("I am loathe to crecae a rule that would make foreign issuers with little relationship to the U.S.
subject to suits here simply because a private party in this country entered into a derivatives contract that
references the foreign issuer's stock. Such a holding would turn Morrison'spresumption against extraterritoriality on its head."). One commentary expressed concern that this approach "would likely deny all purchasers of ADRs a remedy under [s]ection 10(b)." Christian J. Ward & J. Campbell Baker, Commentary,
Morrison v. National Australia Bank: The Impact on Institutionallnvestors, 27 WVESTLA"V
J. CORP. OFFICERS &
DIRECrORs LIABILITY, no. 1, 2012 at *1,*8.For another case that considered the economic reality of the
transaction, see Valentini v. Citigroup, 837 F. Supp. 2d 304, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), which determined that
convertible securities satisfied the second prong of the Morrison transactional test where the securities were
notes that could, under certain circumstances, convert into donsestically-traded stock.
272. No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 AAL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
273. Id. at *6.
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ADRs is considered to be a 'predominantly foreign securities transaction.' ' 274 For further
support, the court focused on the foreign defendant's ADRs that were traded "in a less
75
formal market [than a U.S. exchange] with lower exposure to U.S.-resident buyers."
Both Elliott Associates and Societ Generale unduly expand Morrison's scope. Because the
second prong of the transactional test asks if "the purchase or sale is made in the United
27 6
States," an execution of a swap agreement in the United States should satisfy Morrison.
Likewise, the focus with respect to over-the-counter ADRs should be on whether the
ADR was purchased in the United States. By focusing instead on the foreign shares underlying these securities, the familiarity of the market where the ADRs are traded, and the
number of U.S. resident purchasers, the court in Socift Generale misapplied the Morrison
transactional test.
After Morrison, parties may seek-by contractual agreement-to bring their transaction
within section 10(b) coverage. Hence, a question remains as to what extent parties can use
contractual language to satisfy Morrison's "domestic transactions" prong. In Quail Cruises
Ship Management Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Linitada,2 77 for example, a foreign

corporation argued that the private purchase of foreign stock from another foreign corporation constituted a purchase or sale in the United States under Morrison because the share
purchase agreement contained a forum selection clause providing for U.S. law and designated U.S. law offices as the place of closing.278 The court dismissed the claim, explaining
that "[a]dopting a rule that permits the intent of parties located abroad and contracting
from their home countries in a wholly off-shore transaction to apply United States securi279
ties law is inconsistent with Morrison."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision.280 The appellate
court observed that the plaintiffs had alleged that the closing "actually occurred in the
United States." 281 The court then relied on the definition of "closing" in Black's Law
Dictionary to conclude that the transaction was consummated at closing.28 2 Lastly, the

court found that the purchase agreement confirmed that the sale occurred at this domestic
closing because the agreement stated that the title to the shares did not transfer until
274. Id. at *4, *6 (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). But In re SCOR
Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, 537 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the case from which Copeland
derived this statement, does not actually stand for this assertion. See Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (citing
In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). Prior to Morrison, the
court in SCOR Holding merely stated: "Assuming that the purchase of [ADRs] on the NYSE ... may be
viewed as predominantly foreign securities transactions, it is not contested here that this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over claims arising out of such transactions under the effects test without consideration of
the conduct test." SCOR Holding, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 562. Thus, since the jurisdiction of the ADRs was
uncontested, the court had no occasion to make a determination that the ADRs actually were predominantly
foreign securities.
275. In re Soci/t6 Gtndrale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2010) (quoting Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506). Thus, while section 10(b) evidently covers purchases or
sales of ADRs listed on U.S. exchanges, the statute may not cover ADRs traded over-the-counter.
276. See Morrison v. Nat'l Ausd. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010) (transactional test).
277. 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
278. Id. at 1347-48 (S.D. Fla. 2010), vacated, 645 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).
279. Id. at 1350.
280. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2011).
281. Id. at 1310.
282. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DicrioNARy 291 (9th ed. 2009)).
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closing. 28 3 This decision suggests that section 10(b) coverage may be available for transactions where the parties bought or sold securities in accordance with contractual language
mandating that the closing occur in the United States and that the tide transfer at closing.
Beyond this perception, Quail Cruises presents an interesting contradiction between the
Morrison transactional test and the policy underlying Morrison against interfering with foreign securities regulation. 284 The Eleventh Circuit focused on applying the Morrison
transactional test as literally adopted. 2 85 The district court below, on the other hand,
looked to Morrison's policy rationale, determining that allowing the section 10(b) claim in
this setting would undermine congressional intent concerning the regulation of foreign
transactions. 286 By creating a test that ignores U.S. conduct and the U.S. connections of
the parties, Morrison laid the groundwork for essentially foreign claims such as this to
proceed.
Nonetheless, the interpretation of "domestic transactions" that seems to best comport
with Morrison and the Exchange Act is the irrevocable liability analysis. That analysis
takes into account the statutory meaning of the words "purchase" and "sale" and does not
revive aspects of the rejected conduct and effects test, as a focus on "solicitation" would.
Although the facts needed to establish proof of irrevocable liability in a given situation
frequently may not be clear, mutual acceptance of the agreement's terms and conditions in
the United States should be important. As for whether parties can invoke U.S. federal
securities law based on contractual language alone, it appears they cannot. They may,
however, be able to opt into section 10(b) coverage if contractual language provides that
the closing and title transfer occur in the United States and the parties then perform
accordingly. With that possibility looming, it seems that the transactional test may produce results that Morrison did not foresee.
The last section considers private right of actions after Morrison and whether the
emerging globalization of securities markets calls for action by Congress.
C.

THE ULTIMATE WAVE-PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTIONS AFTER MORRISON

In response to the study called for in the Dodd-Frank Act, parties ranging from foreign
governments to pension funds to law professors have weighed in on whether Congress
ought to reinstate some form of the conduct and effects test for private right of actions
under section 10(b). 28 7 Most foreign governments argue that expanding Morrison would
283. Id. at 1310-11. This comports with the Second Circuit's decision in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund
Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012), which considered the location where the title transferred in
determining if a domestic transaction under Morrison had occurred.
284. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010). The Court stated that it developed a "clear test" to avoid the interference with foreign securities regulation that application of section 10(b)
abroad would produce. Id. It seems counterintuitive then that a foreign-cubed case would satisfy the transactional test.
285. See Quail Cruises, 645 F.3d at 1310-11 (examining the transaction to determine if the transaction "occurred in the United States" as required under the Morrison transactional test).
286. See Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345,
1350 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that even if the transaction closed in the United States, the purchase or sale
occurred abroad because, under Morrison, it is Congress's intent, not the parties' intent, that is "dispositive of
the application of federal securities law to foreign securities transactions").
287. See, e.g., Letter from Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 18,
2011) (group of sixteen pension funds), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-13.pdf; Letter
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create conflicts with foreign law. 28 8 For instance, unlike the United States, many European countries have not adopted or have limited class actions, have limited discovery, do
not allow contingency fees, and require the loser to pay litigation costs.289 Instead, these
countries have made deliberate decisions not to provide the same remedies as are available
in the United States. 290 Additionally, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Switzerland argue that expansion of Morrison is not necessary because each country has remedies available to U.S. investors who invest in foreign markets. 291 Several of the
governments emphasize cooperation between regulating authorities as an effective way to
deal with transnational securities. 292 Overall, foreign governments advocate that the section 10(b) private right of action should remain limited by Morrison.
U.S. pension funds, on the other hand, advocate that section 10(b) ought to extend to
all purchases and sales of securities by financial institutions located in the United States
and by individuals and entities who reside in the United States. 293 Five Ohio pension
funds assert that U.S. and European Union brokers are required by legislation to execute
purchases and sales on the exchange that, under the circumstances, most benefits the client.2 94 Investors therefore have no idea through which exchange(s) their orders will be
from Jonathan Taylor, Managing Dir. Fin., Servs. & Stability, U.K., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Feb.
11, 2011) (U.K. government), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-4.pdf; Robert P. Bartlett, II, Assistant Professor of Law at the Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Sch. of Law, et al., to Elizabeth Murphy,
Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 18, 2011) (group of forty-two law professors), available at http://sec.gov/comments/4-617/4
617-28.pdf.
288. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 287, at 9 (United Kingdom); Letter from Klaus Botzet, Legal Advisor &
Consul General, Fed. Republic of Ger., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 2-3 (Feb. 18, 2011) (Germany),
available
athttp://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-12.pdf; Letter from La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, Fr., to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, et. al., at 2-3 (Feb. 17, 2011) (France), available at http://www.
sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-29.pdf. See generally MARc I. STFINBERG, IN'TERNATIONAL SECURITIES
LAW: A CONTI-EIMPORARY AND COMPARATIVE A "ALYsis

(1998).

289. See Taylor, supra note 287, at 2-3 (United Kingdom); La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, supra note
288, at 4 (France). The comment by France even provided, "French courts would almost certainly refuse to
enforce a court judgment in a U.S. 'opt out' class action because such a judgment violates French constitutional principles and public policy." Id. at 7. For a detailed comparison of U.S. and foreign securities law, see
Letter from Mouvement des Entreprises de Fr. et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at app. (Feb. 18,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-46.pdf.
290. See Taylor, supra note 287, at 2-3 (United Kingdom); La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, supra note
288, at 7 (France).
291. Taylor, supranote 287, at 8-9 (United Kingdom); La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, supra note 288,
at 6-7 (France); Botzet, sipra note 288, at 2-3 (Germany); Letter from Manuel Sager, Ambassador, Switz., to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 2 (Feb. 23, 2011) (Switzerland), available athttp://www.sec.gov/comments/
4-617/4617-53.pdf.
292. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 287, at 7 (United Kingdom); La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, supra
note 288, at 8 (France); Sager, supra note 291, at 3 (Switzerland).
293. See Cal. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., supra note 287, at I (sixteen public pension funds from eleven
different states managing $732 billion); Letter from Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. et al., to Elizabeth Murphy,
Sec'y, SEC (Feb. 18, 2011) (five
Ohio public pension funds managing $162 billion), available at http://www.
7 6
sec.gov/comments/4-617/461 -1 .pdf; Letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli, State Comptroller, N.Y., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 1 (Feb. 18, 2011) (trustee of the $141 billion New York State Common Retirement Fund), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-1 1.pdf. Cf Letter from Robbins Gellar
Rudman & Dowd LLP, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 4 (Feb. 18, 2011) (institutional investors of
foreign pension funds worth $134 billion urging Congress to reinstate the conduct and effects test), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-39.pdf.
294. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., supra note 293, at 7.
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directed.295 Additionally, many states mandate that state pension funds engage in prudent
diversification.296 For some funds, this requires the purchase of securities on foreign exchanges.297 Several funds contend that a private right of action for U.S. investors, regardless of where the affected securities transaction(s) are consummated, is essential to
effectuate the Exchange Act's primary purpose of protecting investors. 298
A comment by a group of forty-two law professors also supports extending section 929P
of the Dodd-Frank Act to private plaintiffs. 299 The professors argued that, with the fluid
and international nature of modem financial markets, the place of a trade is becoming
increasingly arbitrary. 300 For instance, they predicted that the proposed merger of the
Deutsche Borse and NYSE Euronext (which subsequently was scuttled) would result in
offshore trades that, in the past, would have been executed in the United States.3 0' Rather
than focus on where a trade occurs, the group urged Congress to focus on where an
investor is induced to trade.302 Additionally, when foreign issuers list their stock in the
United States and voluntarily subject themselves to U.S. securities laws, as National Australia did in Morrison by offering ADRs on the NYSE, the group argued that-concerns
about international comity are minimized. 30 3 Lastly, the professors pointed to the numer0
ous dismissals of securities fraud cases since Morrison as evidence of its shortcomings.3 4
295. Id. See also Letter from National Ass'n of Shareholder & Consumer Attorneys, to Elizabeth Murphy,
Sec'y, SEC, at 21 (Feb. 18, 2011) (noting that the exchange used is not often under the investor's control),
available at http://www.see.gov/coinments/4-617/4617-18.pdf.
296. See Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., s-tpra
note 293, at 7-8; DiNapoli, supra note 293, at 2. As of December
31, 2010, about 29 percent of the New York State Common Retirement Fund's public equities were international, with most of them purchased on foreign exchanges. Id. at 2.
297. See Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., supra note 293, at 8 (stating that "an investor seeking to have automotive industry representation simply cannot avoid buying Toyota or Volkswagen and cannot buy into energy
without purchasing BP or Royal Dutch Shell"). As an example of the potentially negative effects of Mrrison,
the trustee for the New York State Common Retirement Fund noted that the fund purchased BP shares on a
foreign exchange and, thus, may not be able to continue its role as co-lead plaintiff against BP concerning
misrepresentations about the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. DiNapoli, supra note 293, at 2-3. The
trustee
pointed out that 40 percent of BP's assets and workers are in North America, that 40 percent of its
ordinary shares are owned by U.S. investors, and that BP has two wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries. Id. For a
further discussion of Morrison's impact on institutional investors, see Ward & Baker, sipranote 271.
298. See Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys., svpra
note 287, at 7-8, 14; Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., supra
note 293,
at 3-5.
299. Bartlett, sapra note 287, at 5.
300. Id. at 7.
301. Id. at 5-6. European officials have since blocked this deal, and the parent company of the NYSE has
decided not to pursue the merger. See Jacob Bunge, NYSE-Deutscbe B?rse
Joins Dead-Deal List, WALL ST.J.,
Feb. 2, 2012, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020465290457719644357339
9260.html; Aaron Smith et al., NYSE-Frankfiirt Stock Exchange Merger Blocked, CNN MONEY (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/01/markets/nyseeuronext deutsche_boerse/index.htm.
302. Bartlett, stpra note 287, at 7 (arguing that "[i]f a person in the U.S. is approached by brokers in the
U.S. and is led to execute a trade on a foreign exchange, surely that trade is territorial, not extraterritorial").
In urging the Commission to reflect on the benefits of reinstating the conduct and effects test, the professors
suggested that the Commission "consider analogies to Regulation S's 'directed selling efforts"' and "the extent of trading in categories of economically equivalent instruments," such as ADRs and swaps backed by
foreign shares. Id. at 8.
303. Id. at 8-10. The group of professors remarked that plaintiffs in Morrison did not emphasize these facts
before the Supreme Court. Id. at 13.
304. See id. at 13-18 (describing twelve cases dismissed or pending a motion to dismiss since Morrison).
Many of the professors were also persuaded by the scenario painted by Justice
Stevens in Morrison, where a
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By comparison, they claimed that the conduct and effects test "captures the potential com305
plexity of the relationships among investors and issuers."
The Commission issued its report based on the Dodd-Frank study in April 2012.306
Rather than recommend a particular course of action, the Commission put forth several
alternatives regarding private right of actions for Congressional consideration. 307 These
alternatives ranged from extending the conduct and effects test that Congress granted the
Commission and DOJ in the Dodd-Frank Act, 30 8 to supplementing and clarifying the
second prong of the Morrison transaction test,30 9 to taking no action at all. 310 Issuing a
dissenting statement on the report, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar expressed his "strong
disappointment," citing the report's lack of any specific recommendations and its failure
to accurately portray the "immense and irreparable investor harm" resulting from

31
Morrison. 1

In the SEC comments submitted by the various parties, the main disagreement appears
to concern whether section 10(b) coverage ought to be available to U.S. investors who
purchased or sold securities of foreign issuers. In that situation, the United States has an
interest in protecting U.S. investors, while a foreign government has an interest in policing issuers within its country. The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law observes that, with the increasing globalization of securities markets,
territorial factors may become less relevant. 312 Conversely, the place of representations
and negotiations, 313 the nationality and residency of the parties, 314 and the effect of the
retiree, after being sold doomed securities in a door-to-door sale by an executive of a foreign-owned U.S.
subsidiary, might be barred from bringing a section 10(b) action. Id. at 6 (discussing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
305. Id. at 11. Note that one of the authors of this article, Marc I. Steinberg, joined this comment letter.
306. See generally STUDY ON THE CRoss-BORDER SCOPE, supra note 62.
307. Id. at 58-59.
308. See id. at 60-64. The Commission offered variations on the conduct and effects test for private rights of
actions, such as an additional requirement "that the plaintiffs injury resulted directly from conduct within the
United States" or that a U.S. investor brought the complaint. Id. at 61.
309. See id. at 64-69. Options presented for consideration included:
1. Permit Investors to Pursue a Section 10(b) Private Action for the Purchase or Sale of any
Security that Is of the Same Class of Securities Registered in the United States, Irrespective of the
Actual Location of the Transaction
2. Authorize Section 10(b) Private Actions Against Securities Intermediaries that Engage in Securities Fraud While Purchasing or Selling Securities Overseas for U.S. Investors
3. Permit Investors to Pursue a Section 10(b) Private Action if They Can Demonstrate that They
Were Induced While in the United States to Engage in the Transaction, Irrespective of Where
the Actual Transaction Occurred
4. Clarify that an Off-Exchange Transaction Takes Place in the United States if Either Party
Made the Offer to Sell or Purchase, or Accepted the Offer to Sell or Purchase, While in the
United States
Id. at
310.
311.
(Apr.

64-68.
See id. at 57-58 (noting that this approach would leave interpretation of Morrison to the courts).
See Luis A. Aguilar, Statement by Commissioner: Defrauded Investors Deserve Their Day in Court, SEC
11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spchO41112laa.htm.

312. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416(1) (1987).

313. Id. § 416(2)(b).
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transaction or conduct on U.S. markets and investors 3 5 become more important. 316
Clearly, the locale of a transaction will become increasingly irrelevant if international exchange mergers become widespread. If the Exchange Act is to adequately protect U.S.
investors and markets in the future, non-territorial factors, such as those set forth in the
Restatement, must play a pivotal role in determining the scope of the section 10(b) private
right of action. 317 For these reasons, Congress needs to reconsider the substantive scope
of section 10(b) as applied to transactions consummated abroad.

VI.

Conclusion

Morrison has significant ramifications. Overall, the decision (1) altered the longstanding

treatment of extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional issue; (2) rendered it more difficult to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality under federal law; and (3) dramatically narrowed the scope of section 10(b) with respect to transnational frauds. The first
two changes primarily have affected federal law outside of U.S. securities law. Statutory
requirements are being scrutinized after Morrison to ensure that they are not incorrectly
characterized as jurisdictional issues. Additionally, Morrison's strict approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality is driving discussions where a statute's extraterritorial

reach is unsettled. It is the creation of the transactional test, however, that will have the
most lasting reverberations on the legal tapestry.
Both securities law and non-securities law have been impacted by the transactional test,
but in very different ways. The focus in securities law will be gaining an understanding of
what it means to have a "domestic transaction" under Morrison. This may entail development of the irrevocable liability analysis and possibly some incorporation of contract law
concepts. On the whole, with respect to private rights of action, it can be said that the
transactional test sets a much higher threshold for section 10(b) claims than the now defunct conduct and effects test ever did.
As for non-securities law, Morrison can be expected to guide the important development
of the standards that instruct courts as to the proper application of a statute. RICO is
likely the first of many statutes to be examined by courts in accordance with the process
set forth in Morrison-thatis, the process of first identifying the focus of a statute based on
its statutory language and legislative history and then deciphering a minimum-U.S.-contact test in accordance with that focus, all the while being mindful of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. With the globalization of finance and business markets, ascertaining the requisite U.S. nexus under an applicable statute will become increasingly critical in discerning the boundaries of U.S. law.
314. Id. § 416(2)(c). This factor may be particularly important when seeking to protect members of the
United States armed forces stationed abroad. Id. at rptr. note 2.
6 2
315. See id. § 41 ( )(a) (considering "whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be expected
to have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities of the same issuer or on
holdings in such securities by United States nationals or residents").
316. Id. § 416 cmt. a.
317. Under the Restatement, it would be reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdiction based on
representations made in the United States and for the protection of a U.S. investor. See id. § 416(2)(b)-(c),
cmt. a. This is not to say that the application of foreign law would be inappropriate. As in blue sky law, the
transaction may have sufficient connection to both U.S. and foreign law to warrant application of either law.
See Joseph C. Long, 12 BLUE SKYLAW § 4.1 (2010).
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